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AN INDUCTION PRINCIPLE AND
PIGEONHOLE PRINCIPLES FOR K-FINITE SETS
Andreas Blass
Abstract. We establish a course-of-values induction principle for K-finite sets in
intuitionistic type theory. Using this principle, we prove a pigeonhole principle conjec-
tured by Be´nabou and Loiseau. We also comment on some variants of this pigeonhole
principle.
1. Introduction
The pigeonhole principle says that a finite set cannot be mapped one-to-one into
a proper subset. There is a dual principle saying that a finite set cannot be mapped
onto a proper superset. We consider these principles in the context of constructive
logic. The motivation for these considerations came from a weak version of the dual
pigeonhole principle proved constructively by Be´nabou and Loiseau, who noted that
their argument does not establish a natural stronger version of the principle.
Throughout this paper we work in an intuitionistic type theory of the sort that
arises as the internal logic of an elementary topos [3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11]. Although the
questions we consider originated in the course of topos-theoretic work of Be´nabou
and Loiseau [4], many of our results are theorems of intuitionistic type theory (in
fact of intuitionistic third-order logic) and involve no reference to topoi.
Of the several concepts of finiteness that are equivalent in classical logic but
not in intuitionistic logic, we shall use the one commonly called K-finiteness or
Kuratowski-finiteness [1, 9, 10]. The definition and some comments on it are given
in Section 2. Henceforth, we omit the prefix K and refer simply to finiteness.
Be´nabou and Loiseau showed [4, Prop. 5.3] that, if X is finite and inhabited,
then no function f : X → X × 2 can be surjective. In other words, for every such
f it is not the case that every element of X × 2 is in its range. They pointed out
that this version of the dual pigeonhole principle is weaker (in constructive logic)
than the statement that for every such f there is an element of X × 2 not in its
range. They remarked that the latter, stronger statement “seems to be true, but
we do not have a general proof of it.” One purpose of the present paper is to give
a general proof of it and in fact of the stronger statement obtained by replacing
X × 2 with X + 1.
The proof uses an induction principle whereby, when one proves a property for
an arbitrary finite set X , one can assume the property for all complemented, proper
subsets of X . This principle seems to be of interest independently of the application
that motivated it.
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After explaining our terminology and presenting some preliminary facts in Sec-
tion 2, we devote Section 3 to proving the induction principle. The application
to the stronger version of the dual pigeonhole principle conjectured by Be´nabou
and Loiseau is in Section 4. In Section 5, we consider the (undualized) pigeonhole
principle, showing that a weak version is intuitionistically provable but a strong
version is not. The final Section 6 is about some variants of the dual pigeonhole
principle.
2. Preliminaries
The set theory and logic used in this paper are an intuitionistic type theory of the
sort described in [3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11]. These references differ in some details, but the
differences will not matter in our work. We shall work with elements, subsets, and
families of subsets of some fixed but arbitrary type U , as well as (partial) functions
from U to U .
A set is called inhabited if there exists an element in it. This is stronger (in
intuitionistic logic) than not being empty. A subset A of a set B is a proper subset
if B − A is inhabited, i.e., if B has an element that is not in A. We say that A is
complemented in its superset B if B = A ∪ (B − A), i.e., if every element of B is
either in A or not in A.
A function f is one-to-one if f(x) = f(y) implies x = y. This definition is intu-
itionistically stronger and more natural than the classically equivalent but negation-
filled definition that x 6= y implies f(x) 6= f(y).
We call a set A finite if it belongs to every family X that contains the empty
set ∅ and is closed under adjoining single elements in the sense that if Z ∈ X and
a ∈ A then Z ∪ {a} ∈ X .
The definition trivially implies that ∅ is finite and that, if A is finite, then so is
A ∪ {p} for every p.
This definition also immediately implies an induction principle. To prove that
all finite sets have some property, it suffices to prove that the empty set has the
property (induction basis) and that, whenever Z has the property and a is any
element (in U), then Z ∪{a} also has the property (induction step). We shall refer
to this sort of induction as ordinary induction on finite sets, to distinguish it from
the new induction principle to be established in Section 3.
The definition of finiteness is (intuitionistically) equivalent (cf. [4, Lemma 5.2])
to the definition of K-finiteness given in [9], namely that A belongs to every family
Y that contains ∅ and {a} for all a ∈ A and is closed under binary union. To see
the equivalence, note first that any Y as in the second definition is also an X as in
the first definition, so all finite sets are K-finite. For the other direction, one shows
that the family of finite sets is closed under binary union, so the finite subsets of A
form a Y as in the second definition. To prove that, if x and y are finite then so is
x ∪ y, one proceeds by ordinary induction on x; both the basis and the induction
step are trivial.
An equally trivial induction establishes that every finite set is either empty or
inhabited.
A complemented subset A of a finite set B is finite. To see this, proceed by
induction on B, the basis (B = ∅) being trivial. So suppose the result is true for B
and that A is a complemented subset of B ∪ {p}. Then A ∩B is a complemented
subset of B, so by induction hypothesis it is finite. If p /∈ A, then A = A ∩ B and
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thus A is finite. If p ∈ A then A = (A ∩ B) ∪ {p} and again A is finite. Since A
is complemented in B ∪ {p}, the cases considered in the preceding two sentences
exhaust the possibilities, so the proof is complete.
It follows from the preceding two paragraphs that, if A is a complemented subset
of B then either it is a proper subset or it equals B. Indeed, B −A is also comple-
mented, hence finite, and hence either inhabited or empty. If B − A is inhabited,
then A is a proper subset of B. If B − A is empty then, as A is complemented in
B, we have B = A ∪ (B − A) = A.
We emphasize that the finite sets we work with need not have a decidable equality
relation. That is, we do not assume that x = y or x 6= y. In fact, by [1], such an
assumption would allow us to work in a sub-universe (sub-topos) in which classical
logic holds and would thus remove the whole point of working in intuitionistic logic.
3. An Induction Principle
This section is devoted to establishing an induction principle, different from the
one given by the definition of finiteness, for proving properties of finite sets.
Theorem 1. Let X be a family of finite sets such that
(1) for all finite A, if all complemented proper subsets of A are in X , then also
A ∈ X .
Then X contains all finite sets.
The theorem says that, in order to prove a statement for all finite sets, it suffices
to prove it for an arbitrary finite set A assuming that it holds for all complemented
proper subsets of A. It is related to ordinary induction for finite sets much as
course-of-values induction is related to ordinary induction for natural numbers.
Proof. We show, by ordinary induction on finite sets B (in the sense explained in
Section 2) that
(2) ∀X [(1) =⇒ B ∈ X ].
The basis is easy, for if B = ∅ then B has no proper subset, so (1) applied with
A = B immediately gives B ∈ X .
For the induction step, we assume (2) for a particular finite B; we wish to prove
(2) for B ∪ {p}. So fix an X satisfying (1); we must prove B ∪ {p} ∈ X . Define
Y = {A | A ∈ X and A ∪ {p} ∈ X}.
We claim that (1) holds with Y in place of X . Assuming the claim for a moment,
we can apply the induction hypothesis (2) for B with X instantiated as Y . So we
get B ∈ Y , from which the desired B ∪ {p} ∈ X immediately follows by definition
of Y .
So all that remains is to prove the claim that (1) holds with Y in place of X . So
let A be finite and assume that all its complemented proper subsets are in Y . In
particular, all its complemented proper subsets are in X and so A ∈ X since (1)
holds for X . It remains to prove that A∪{p} ∈ X , and we shall do this by applying
the assumption (1) for X .
So let C be any complemented proper subset of A ∪ {p}; we must show C ∈ X .
As C is complemented, we have p ∈ C or p /∈ C. Also, as C ∩A is a complemented
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subset of A, it is either equal to A or a proper subset of A. We consider the various
cases.
If C ∩ A is a proper subset of A, we use the assumption that Y contains all the
complemented proper subsets of A to conclude that C ∩ A ∈ Y . Then C, being
equal to (C∩A)∪{p} or to C∩A (according to whether p ∈ C), is in X by definition
of Y .
If C ∩A = A and p /∈ C then C = A, and we already saw that A ∈ X .
The remaining case, C ∩A = A and p ∈ C, is impossible as C is a proper subset
of A ∪ {p}.
Thus, we have C ∈ X in all cases, which completes the proof. 
Although Theorem 1 suffices for the proofs in the following sections, it seems
natural to ask whether it could be strengthened by replacing “complemented” with
“finite” in (1). It is not difficult to prove this strengthened induction principle if the
axiom of infinity is available, that is, if the type N of natural numbers is available in
the intuitionistic type theory. The proof begins by showing, by ordinary induction
on finite sets A, that there is a natural number n such that n¯ = {0, 1, . . . , n − 1}
has no one-to-one map into A. Then one shows by induction on n that any set A
admitting no one-to-one map from n¯ must be in every class X that satisfies the
weakened version of (1).
It is not clear to me whether one can obtain the same result without an axiom of
infinity, but it seems that any proof would have to be substantially different from
the one just given. To see this, consider the statement “If A is finite then there is a
finite B such that the equality relation on B is decidable and B has no one-to-one
map into A.” This statement is a reformulation, in the absence of N, of the result of
the first half of the proof given above. (See [1] for the connection between the sets
n¯ and finite sets B with decidable equality.) But this statement is not provable in
intuitionistic type theory without the axiom of infinity. More precisely, there exist
a topos E and a finite object A in it such that, for any object C of E , the statement
“C has a finite subset with decidable equality admitting no one-to-one map into
A” fails to be internally valid.
To construct such a topos, let P be a three-element partially ordered set with
a top element 1 and two incomparable elements a and b below it. Let E ′ be the
topos of presheaves on P in some non-standard model of set theory, and let E
be the subtopos consisting of those presheaves whose values at 1 and a are finite
in the sense of that non-standard model and whose values at b are really finite.
Fix a set S that is finite in the sense of the non-standard model but is not really
finite, and let A be the presheaf whose values at 1 and a are S with the identity as
transition map between them and whose value at b is a singleton. This A is finite
in E . If C is any other object of E, then one can calculate, using Kripke-Joyal
semantics, that a finite subset of C with decidable equality at 1 would have all
three of its components really finite (the b component by definition of E , then the
1 component because decidability makes the transition maps one-to-one, and then
the a component because finiteness makes the transition maps surjective). So, after
restriction to a, it could be mapped one-to-one into A since A(a) is really infinite.
4. The Strong Dual Pigeonhole Principle
The purpose of this section is to establish, in intuitionistic type theory, the
stronger version of the dual pigeonhole principle conjectured by Be´nabou and
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Loiseau, namely that if X is finite and inhabited and f : X → X × 2 then there is
an element of X×2 that is not in the range of f . In fact, our proof gives a stronger
statement with X + 1 instead of X × 2. (To see that the X + 1 result is indeed
stronger than the X × 2 result, it suffices to observe that, since X is inhabited,
there is a surjection X × 2 → X + 1 sending one copy of X in X × 2 onto X and
the other copy onto 1.)
Theorem 2. If A is a finite, complemented, proper subset of B and if f : A→ B,
then B − Range(f) is inhabited.
Proof. Let X be the family of those finite sets A such that, for every B in which
A is a complemented, proper subset and for every f : A → B, there is an element
of B not in the range of f . We prove that X contains all finite sets by applying
Theorem 1. So it suffices to prove A ∈ X under the assumptions that A is finite
and that every complemented, proper subset of A is in X .
To do this, suppose f : A → B where A is a complemented, proper subset of
B. Since A is complemented in B, f−1(A) is complemented in f−1(B) = A. As
was pointed out in Section 2, it follows that f−1(A) either equals A or is a proper
subset of A. If f−1(A) = A, then Range(f) ⊆ A, so the complement in B of this
range includes B−A, which is inhabited because A is a proper subset of B. So the
desired conclusion holds in this case.
There remains the case that f−1(A) is a complemented, proper subset of A and
is therefore in X . Apply the definition of X with f−1(A), A and f ↾ f−1(A) in the
roles of A, B, and f . It shows that A− Range(f ↾ f−1(A)) is inhabited. But this
set equals A−Range(f) ⊆ B − Range(f). 
5. The Undualized Pigeonhole Principle
In this section we consider the principle that a finite set cannot be mapped
one-to-one into a proper subset. More precisely, we consider two intuitionistically
inequivalent versions of this principle. The weaker version says that if X is finite
then a map f : X + 1 → X cannot be one-to-one. The stronger version says that
if X is finite and f : X + 1→ X then there exist x, y ∈ X + 1 such that x 6= y but
f(x) = f(y).
Of course in classical logic these are equivalent and easy to prove. We shall show
that the weaker version is intuitionistically provable but the stronger is not. In
fact, the stronger version implies the law of the excluded middle.
Theorem 3. If X is finite then there is no one-to-one function from X + 1 into
X.
Proof. The statements “X is finite,” “f : X + 1 → X ,” and “f is one-to-one” are
all preserved by inverse images of geometric morphisms of topoi (see [9] especially
Cor. 9.17). So if their conjunction were intuitionistically consistent and therefore
had a non-zero truth value in some elementary topos, then, by Barr’s theorem [2, 9],
it would have a non-zero truth value in some Boolean topos. That is absurd, since
the pigeonhole principle is provable in classical type theory and therefore valid in
every Boolean topos. So the conjunction of the three statements is intuitionistically
inconsistent. 
We remark that a similar proof can be given for the weak form of the dual
pigeonhole principle. The statements “X is finite,” “f : X → X + 1,” and “f
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is surjective” are preserved by inverse images of geometric morphisms, so Barr’s
theorem allows us to conclude their intuitionistic inconsistency from their classical
inconsistency.
In fact, we can do a bit better and replace “X is finite” by the intuitionistically
weaker “X is a subset of a finite set” and still conclude that there is no surjection
X → X + 1 and no one-to-one map X + 1 → X . This is because the weaker
hypothesis suffices for the classical proof and its internal validity is preserved by
geometric inverse images.
In contrast to the situation with the dual pigeonhole principle, where the stronger
form turned out to be provable (Theorem 2), the undualized pigeonhole principle
cannot be similarly strengthened without going to classical logic.
Theorem 4. Assume that, for all finite X and all f : X + 1 → X, there exist x
and y in X + 1 with f(x) = f(y) but x 6= y. Then the law of the excluded middle
holds.
Proof. Let u be an arbitrary truth value, and let X be a set whose elements are
exactly a and b where a = b if and only if u. Such a set X can be obtained as
the quotient of 1 + 1 by an equivalence relation containing all pairs if u and also
containing the diagonal pairs; the equivalence classes of the two distinct elements
of 1 + 1 serve as a and b. Clearly, X is finite.
Writing c for the unique element of 1, we define a map f from X + 1 = {a, b, c}
to X = {a, b} by sending a to itself, b to a, and c to b. This is well-defined even
though a might equal b, since they are sent to the same element a.
By assumption, there are x, y ∈ {a, b, c} with f(x) = f(y) but x 6= y. We have
x = a or x = b or x = c and similarly for y, so we can consider the nine resulting
(exhaustive though not necesarily exclusive) cases. Three “diagonal” cases have
x = y contrary to the choice of x and y. Two other cases have x = c while y = a or
y = b; in these cases f(x) = f(y) means that b = a and therefore u holds. The two
similar cases with y = c also give that u holds. There remain two cases, one with
x = a and y = b and the symmetric one with x = b and y = a. In either of these
two cases, x 6= y means that a 6= b and therefore not u. Thus, in all cases, we have
u or not u. As u was an arbitrary truth value, the proof is complete. 
6. Variants of the Dual Pigeonhole Principle
This section is devoted to refuting two possible strengthenings of Theorem 2.
The first is to weaken the hypothesis from “finite” to “subset of a finite set,” as
we did with the weak pigeonhole principles in the remarks following Theorem 3.
For the strong dual pigeonhole principle, this further strengthening is not only
unprovable intuitionistically but equivalent to classical logic.
Theorem 5. Assume that, whenever A is a subset of a finite set and f : A→ A+1
then there is an element of A+1 not in the range of f . Then the law of the excluded
middle holds.
Proof. Let u be any truth value, and let U be the corresponding subobject of 1
(inhabited if and only if u). Since 1 is finite, we can apply the hypothesis of the
theorem with A = U . Let f : U → U + 1 be the inclusion of U in the second
summand 1 of U + 1. By hypothesis, U + 1 has an element x /∈ Range(f). If x is
in the first summand U , then (as U is thereby inhabited) u holds. If x is in the
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second summand 1, then, by definition of f , it would belong to the range of f with
truth value u. Since it does not belong to this range, we conclude that not u. As
x must be in one of the two summands, we have proved that u or not u. 
Finally, we consider an attempt to extend Theorem 2 from the internal logic of
topoi (intuitionistic type theory) to the external logic. Specifically, if A is a finite
object in a topos E and if f : A→ A+1 is a morphism in E , must A+1 have a global
section disjoint from the image of f? The answer is negative. For a counterexample,
consider a topos with an inhabited finite object A having no global section, and
let f : A → A + 1 map A onto the summand 1. A global section of A + 1 disjoint
from the range of f would be a global section of A and thus does not exist. For
a simple example of a topos containing such an A, use the topos of presheaves on
a four-element poset {p, q, r, s} where p is incomparable with q, r is incomparable
with s, and both p and q are below both r and s. Let A be the presheaf whose
value at each point is 1+1 and whose transition maps are the identity map of 1+1
except for one, say from r to p, that interchanges the elements of 1 + 1. Then A
clearly has no global section, but it is inhabited and finite and in fact internally
isomorphic to 1 + 1.
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